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) 
) Civil Action File No. 
) 2014CV244363 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs, 
MATTHEW LIOTTA and PODPONICS, LLC 
Defendants o 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR 
MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT 
On August 5, 2014, this Court held a hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the 
Alternative for More Definite Statement. Upon consideration of the briefs and arguments of 
counsel, the Court rules on the motion as set out herein. 
It is well established that: 
[ a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with 
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the 
claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the 
complaint sufficient to wan-ant a grant of the relief sought. ... In deciding a motion 
to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed 
them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing 
party's favor. ' 
Scouten v, Amerisave Mortgage Corp., 283 Ga. 72,73,656 S.E.2d 820, 821 (2008) (quoting 
Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997»; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11- 
12(b)(6). 
So viewed, the Complaint states that Plaintiff Building Technology Consulting, LLC 
("BTC") was the 40% owner of HydroMod, LLC ("Hydro Mod") and Defendant PodPonics, LLC 
("PodPonics") was the 60% owner. Defendant Matthew Liotta served as Manager of HydroMod 
and is a member of PodPonics. Plaintiff Rudy Blake Frazier is a member of BTC. 
PodPonics developed a process for growing lettuce in shipping containers and was 
interested in selling shipping container grow houses to third parties. Frazier alleges that he 
improved PodPonic's original shipping container grow house concept by introducing Liotta to 
his invention, a Grow Rack System. Frazier and Liotta, through BTC and PodPonics, formed 
HydroMod for the purpose of building and installing Grow Racks for both PodPonics's own use 
and sale to third parties. Frazier and BTC provided sweat equity and $400 as their initial 
contribution to HydroMod; while Liotta and PodPonics provided financial support. Plaintiffs 
allege that from the time of HydroMod's inception, HydoMod had sold 394 Grow Racks, and 
HydroMod had developed the ability to fill the orders profitably. Also, PodPonics could buy 
Grow Racks from HydroMod to incorporate them into the shipping container grow houses and 
then to sell them to third parties. 
Frazier also drew up designs for his Grow Rack System so that Liotta could register for a 
patent. Frazier believed it would be a patent held by HydroMod, but Liotta, an owner of 
PodPonics, registered the patent in PodPonics's name instead. In addition to his work on the 
Grow Rack System on behalf of HydroMod, Frazier alleges that he rendered valuable services 
directly to PodPonics. For example, Frazier claims that he helped Liotta and PodPonics market 
the PodPonics grow houses internationally to third parties. 
Frazier and BTC now claim that Liotta and PodPonics have squeezed them out of the 
Grow Rack building venture. First, Plaintiffs claim that PodPonics misappropriated and usurped 
a business opportunity with a customer called Desert Group that was developed by and through 
HydroMod so that PodPonics could maximize its profits to the detriment of HydroMod. 
2 
Frazier et al., v. Liotta et al., Case No. 2014cv244363, Order on Motion to Dismiss 
Additionally, on January 16,2014, Liotta notified Frazier that he was terminating all contracts 
with Frazier and BTC and was dissolving HydroMod. A Certificate of Termination was issued 
for HydroMod by the Georgia Secretary of State on January 10, 2014 with an effective date of 
December 26,2013. Frazier claims that he had no knowledge that a Certificate of Termination 
had been filed and that he continued to work for HydroMod until the January 16 meeting. 
Plaintiffs claim breach of contract, breaches of fiduciary duty, quantum meruit/unjust 
enrichment, conversion, fraud and deceit, and tortious interference with contractual or business 
relations. They are seeking compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief for the 
immediate return of Plaintiffs' drawings and inventions as well as an order directing Defendants 
to cease and desist from using these drawings for their own advantage. Defendants seek 
dismissal in the entirety on the basis that Plaintiffs are required to bring their claims in a 
derivative action, not a direct action, and of each individual claim on the basis of failure to state a 
claim. 
1. Direct Action Analysis 
As a general rule, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty or misappropriation of corporate 
assets by a director or officer of a corporation belongs to the corporation, not its shareholders, 
and should be brought as a derivative action. Barnett v. Fullard, 306 Ga. App. 151, 152 (2010). 
The reasons underlying this general rule are that it 1) prevents multiple lawsuits by shareholders; 
2) protects corporate creditors by putting the damages from the recovery back in the corporation; 
3) protects the interest of all shareholders by increasing the value of their shares, instead of 
allowing recovery by one shareholder to prejudice the rights of others not a party to the suit; and 
4) adequately compensates the injured shareholder by increasing the value of his shares. Thomas 
v. Dickson, 250 Ga. 772, 786 (1983). The Georgia Supreme Court, while acknowledging the 
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general rule, has directed that courts should look to the "realistic objectives" of a given case to 
determine if a direct action is proper. ld. (citing Kaplan's Nadler, Georgia Corporation Law, § 
11-16 (1971)). A shareholder may bring a direct rather than a derivative action in the instance of 
a closely held corporation where the evidence shows that the reasons for the general rule 
requiring a derivative suit do not apply. Barnett, 306 Ga. App. at 152. 
Here, BTC and PodPonics are the only two shareholders in HydroMod and both are 
parties to the suit so a derivative action is not necessary to prevent multiple lawsuits by 
shareholders or prejudice to other shareholders. Also, by filing the Certificate of Termination on 
behalf of HydroMod, the company represented that it did not have any debts or liabilities, so 
corporate creditors would not be harmed by allowing Plaintiffs to bring a direct action. And 
because HydroMod was dissolved, no shareholder could be prejudiced or injured. HydroMod 
was a closely held corporation and none of the four principles underlying the general rule apply 
here. Plaintiffs' direct action may be properly maintained. Therefore, it is unnecessary for 
Plaintiffs to satisfy O.C.G.A. § 14-11-801(2) requiring that a plaintiff make a written demand on 
the manager or members of the corporation. 
2. Individual Claims 
A. Breach of Contract 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have only identified one contract in this case-the 
HydroMod Operating Agreement-and that a claim for breach of the Operating Agreement fails 
for two reasons: (1) Frazier and Liotta are not parties to the Operating Agreement, and (2) the 
Operating Agreement does not does not preclude or require either Defendant to carry out the 
activities of which Plaintiffs complain. The COUlt agrees that the second reason is fatal to a 
claim for breach of the Operating Agreement. HydroMod's Operating Agreement gives Liotta as 
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Manager and PodPonics as Majority Member broad discretion in conducting the business of 
HydroMod. For instance, the Operating Agreement does not compel Liotta or PodPonics to call 
meetings, order an accounting, or continue any exclusive business relationship with BTC or 
Frazier. Likewise, the election to dissolve the Company can be (and was) made by majority 
vote. Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim is GRANTED as to 
any alleged breach of the Operating Agreement. 
The COUli does, however, find sufficient allegations in the Complaint of side agreements 
between Frazier and BTC and either Liotta individually, or Liotta, on behalf of PodPonics, that 
are separate from HydroMod's limited purpose of developing and selling Grow Racks. For 
instance, Plaintiffs allege that they undertook international marketing efforts to sell the entire 
shipping container grow house concept and prepared drawings for a patent application. Plaintiffs 
are not required to plead the facts demonstrating the formation and mutually agreed terms of 
these side agreements, if such exist, at this early stage ofthe litigation. Therefore, Defendants' 
motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim is DENIED as to any oral agreements between 
the parties that are not contemplated by HydroMod's Operating Agreement. 
B. Quantum Meruit I Unjust Enrichment 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim fails because 
this claim only applies when there is no legal contract. "Ordinarily, when one renders service or 
transfers property which is valuable to another, which the latter accepts, a promise is implied to 
pay the reasonable value thereof." O.C.G.A. § 9-2-7. "A claim of quantum meruit requires 
proof that (1) the provider performed as agent services valuable to the recipient; (2) either at the 
request of the recipient or knowingly accepted by the recipient; (3) the recipient's receipt of 
which without compensating the provider would be unjust; and (4) provider's expectation of 
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compensation at the time of rendition of services." Bedsole v. Action Outdoor Adver. JV, LLC, 
325 Ga. App. 194,200 (2013). It is clear from the allegations of the Complaint that Plaintiffs 
claim they were not adequately compensated for drawings used for the patent applications 
allegedly submitted by PodPonics for its own benefit or for marketing of the PodPonics grow 
houses internationally, an effort that was outside of the scope of the HydroMod venture. 
Development of the facts will clarify whether the parties mutually agreed that this work would 
be done by Frazier individually or Frazier on behalfofBTC, for Liotta individually, or for Liotta 
on behalf of PodPonics. Therefore, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their quantum meruit/unjust 
enrichment claim, and Defendants' motion to dismiss this count is DENIED. 
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary duty should fail to the 
extent that it relies on the existence of an "overarching partnership." "It is well settled that a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of three elements: (1) the existence of a 
fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach." 
UWork.com, Inc. v. Paragon Techs., Inc., 321 Ga. App. 584, 594 (2013) (citations omitted). "A 
fiduciary duty exists where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the 
will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, 
the law requires the utmost good faith, such as the relationship between partners, principal and 
agent, etc." ld. at 594-95 (citing O.C.G.A § 23-2-58). Liotta, as manager of HydroMod, owes 
fiduciary duties. It is unclear what fiduciary duties would be owed by Liotta and/or PodPonics 
from relationships formed in the course of the side agreements with BTC and Frazier as 
discussed above, but the court is unable at this point in the litigation to say that no set of facts 
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could be introduced to support this claim .. Therefore, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' breach of 
fiduciary duty claim is DENIED. 
D. Conversion 
Defendants next argue that any conversion claim would belong to HydroMod. See 
Taylor v. Powertel, 250 Ga. App. 356,358 (2001) (noting that for conversion claim to succeed, 
plaintiff must show they have a property interest in the designs and drawings that are possessed 
and being unlawfully used by Defendants). The Court has already held that BTC can bring a 
direct action instead of a derivative action on behalf of HydroMod. Further, Plaintiffs have 
sufficiently alleged that Frazier and BTC designed the Grow Racks for HydroMod but that Liotta 
filed a patent application incorporating the Grow Rack system on behalf of PodPonics. 
Therefore, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' conversion claim is DENIED. 
E. Fraud 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not specifically pled its fraud claim as required by 
OCGA § 9-11-9(b) and that a mere failure to perform on a contract does not amount to fraud. 
See Brockv. King, 279 Ga. App. 335, 339 (2006). The elements of fraud are "(1) false 
representation by defendant; (2) scienter; (3) intent to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from 
acting; (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (5) damage to the plaintiff." Lakeside 
Investment Group. v. Allen, 253 Ga. App. 448,450 (2002). Plaintiffs claim that they were 
induced to create drawings and designs used for the patent application with the understanding 
that the patent would be applied for on behalf of HydroMod, not PodPonics. Plaintiffs also claim 
that Defendants represented that HydroMod would get a higher percentage of profits for direct 
sales that it initiated under an agreed pricing structure, but instead, PodPonics sold Grow Racks 
directly to clients, Desert Group in particular, in an attempt to cut Plaintiffs out of the profits. 
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Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants committed fraud by dissolving HydroMod and terminating 
all agreements with Frazier and BTC after Plaintiffs were led to believe that they would share in 
the profits from their contributions. In Sh01i, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants induced Plaintiffs 
into reasonably believing that they were both working towards the goal of making HydroMod a 
successful company, while Defendants true intent was to usurp the inventions and opportunities 
for their own exclusive gain. The fraud count has been sufficiently pled with particularity and 
therefore, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud and deceit claim is DENIED. 
F. Tortious interference with contractual or business relations 
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contractual 
or business relations must fail because Defendants were not strangers to the alleged business 
relationship between HydroMod and its customer, Desert Group. "In order to prevail on a claim 
alleging tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a valid 
contract and that the defendant acted intentionally, without privilege or legal justification, to 
induce another not to enter into or continue a business relationship with the plaintiff, thereby 
causing the plaintiff financial injury." Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt., Co. v. McLane, 269 Ga. 604, 
608 (1998). In the Atlanta Market case, the Georgia Supreme COUli, recognizing that its ruling 
would reduce the number of entities that could maintain such a claim, held that "to be liable for 
tortious interference, one must be a stranger to both the contract at issue and the business 
relationship giving rise to and underpinning the contract." Id. at 609. "In other words, all 
partlies] to an interwoven contractual arrangement are not liable for tortious interference with 
any of the contracts or business relationships." Id. Subsequent cases have expanded the so-called 
"stranger doctrine" privilege to defendants with a "legitimate economic interest" in the contract 
or a party to the contract, even though it is not a signatory to the contract or where there is a 
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"legitimate relationship of the alleged interloper or meddler to the contract." Tidikis v. Network 
for Med. Comm. & Research, LLC, 214 Ga. App. 807,812-13 (2005) (affirming dismissal of 
employee's tortious interference with an employment contract claim against majority shareholder 
of employer because majority shareholder had financial interest in employer); see also ULQ, 
LLC v. Meder, 293 Ga. App. 176, 183-84 (2008) (holding that terminated officer and 10% owner 
of LLC could not interfere with business and contractual relationships between the LLC and debt 
collection customer because 10% owner was not a stranger due to his financial interest in LLC); 
Mabra v. SF, Inc., 316 Ga App 62, 65 (20 12) (affirming dismissal of produce distributor's 
tortious interference with an airport concessionaire's distribution contract claim against 
concession corporations that decided to purchase produce from other sources because concession 
corporations "had a direct economic interest in or benefitted from the contract at issue" and 
therefore were not strangers to the contract despite the complaint's express allegations to the 
contrary). The Georgia courts have also extended the stranger doctrine to claims of tortious 
interference with business relations where a defendant "caused a party or third party to 
discontinue or fail to enter into an anticipated business relationship with the plaintiff." See 
Mabra, 316 Ga. App. at 64 (quoting Tidikis, 274 Ga. App. at 812)); see also Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. 
Mgmt., Co., 269 Ga. at 609 n.2 (noting that stranger doctrine applies in tortious interference with 
contract and tortious interference with business relationship). 
As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege the existence of a 
valid contract between HydroMod and Desert Group as required to maintain a tortious 
interference with a contract claim. See Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt., Co., 269 Ga. at 608. Instead, 
they allege "probable additional sales to Desert Group and others" and that "Desert Group had 
made it clear that if they were satisfied with the first 20 racks they were purchasing they might 
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be ordering an additional 200 racks." Compi. ~~ 132,47 (emphasis added). This illusory 
promise by Desert Group does not establish a valid contract, a necessary element of a tortious 
interference with contract claim. 
Even if the Complaint sufficiently alleged the existence of a contract between HydroMod 
and Desert Group, both a tortious interference with contract claim and a tortious interference 
with a business relationship claim would fail because Defendants are not strangers to the 
interwoven contracts or business relationships. PodPonics had a legitimate financial interest in 
HydroModl Desert Group business relationship as the majority member of HydroMod. 
Likewise, Liotta had a legitimate fmancial interest in the HydroModiDesert Group business 
relationship both as HydroMod's manager and as a member of Pod Po nics. Above and beyond 
the financial interest of the D.efendants, the Complaint asserts that HydroMod's opportunities to 
sell Grow Racks directly to customers (as opposed to indirectly through PodPonics as a larger 
package deal) would result in an opportunity for PodPonics to sell other items needed to set up a 
shipping container grow house. Neither PodPonics nor Liotta were strangers to the business 
relationship between HydroMod and Desert Group. Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss 
for tortious interference of contractual or business relations is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, this ~ day of August, 2014. 
Judge Melvin K. Westmoreland on behalf of 
The Honorable Elizabeth E. Long 
Judge, Fulton County Business Court 
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Copies to: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Attorney fer Defendant 
Thomas Richelo Scott Bonder 
RICHELO LAW GROUP, LLC Joseph A. White 
951 Glenwood Ave. FRIED & BONDER, LLC 
Unit 1003 White Provision, Suite 305 
Atlanta, Georgia 30316 1170 Howell Mill Rd., N.W. 
trichelo@richelolaw.com Atlanta, Georgia 30318 
(404) 995-8808 
sbonder@friedbonder.com 
jwhite@fIredbonder.com 
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